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The topic being related to white crime, the scientific study of political 
corruption poses several methodological problems both with the measurement 
of the dependent variable (i.e. the size and type of corruption) and the 
independent factors that can explain such levels of corruption. This is 
particularly true in the Belgian case, as until now, little empirical scientific 
research has been carried out on political corruption in Belgium* 1 *. In addition, 
the number of cases for which solid data exists is rare, given the fact that only a 
small number of corruption allegations has been brought to trial (see below).
On the other hand, there are several indicators suggesting that political 
corruption is, or at least has been, widespread in Belgium in the 1970s and 
1980s. Secondly, many of the factors that in the comparative literature on 
political corruption have been identified as facilitators of political corruption 
are, or until the beginning of the 1990s, were strongly present in the Belgian 
case.
So below, we will first look at the indicators about the degree of political 
corruption in recent Belgian history. Secondly, we will present a short overview 
of the types of political corruption that have been identified. Thirdly, directing 
particular attention to the party factors identified by Della Porta in her 
discussion paper, we will ask to what extent classical causes of corruption are in 
fact salient for explaining political corruption in Belgium. In terms of the time 
limits in this paper, as most corruption cases refer to practices in the 1970s and 
1980s, we will focus on this period, but also indicate the changes brought about 
in the 1990s.
A. SIZE
1. Transparency International Index
According to the TI Political Corruption Perception index of 1998, Belgium is 
after Italy and Greece perceived as the most corrupt country in the European 
Union' (it holds the 28th place from among the 85 countries included in the 
index). In 1997 (26th place in the index) it was only surpassed by Italy.
' This paper was prepared for the conference on Political Parties and Corruption, European 
University Institute, Florence, March 18-20, 1999
1 Also the journalistic accounts are of dubious quality in terms of sources and tend to 
denounce rather than to reveal or clarify.
' In 1996 (20th place) it was surpassed by Portugal, Greece, Spain and Italy. In the 1980-1985 



























































































It should, however, be kept in mind that this index is only a perception 
index, an assessment of the corruption level as perceived by business people, 
risk analysts and the general public (based on 9 and 10 surveys in 1998 and 
1997 respectively). The recent Belgian position on the index is characterised by 
a very high variance3 between the rankings of Belgium in the different surveys 
used, which suggest quite diverse opinions between different sources. The high 
variance is mostly due to inclusion (since 1997) of the General Gallup survey 
presenting the perception of the public at large and a lesser degree by 
reassessments of business people and risk analysts. Thus, the recent worsening 
of the position of Belgium on the Tl-index is mainly due to the inclusion of 
public opinion (a source that was not included for any country in the previous 
years either) that perceives politicians, public officials, policemen and judges to 
be more corrupt than those of most other European countries placed higher on 
the perception index.
Thus, this deconstruction of the Belgian score shows to what extent the 
index is vulnerable to shifts in moods or perceptions of the public. Evidently, 
the wave of corruption cases that since 1994 have shocked the Belgians had an 
effect on public perception of the degree of corruption of Belgian politicians4, 
independently of the fact that most of the cases that emerged were related to 
affairs that occurred in a more distant past, i.e. the period before party public 
financing. However, through a matter of coincidences (the judicial enquiry on 
the murder of socialist party leader Cools murder, that lead to the discovery of 
Agusta-Dassault affair) these cases were only now being investigated or 
brought to trial.
2. Allegations of Corruption in the Past 25 Years
A quick overview on the basis of inventories made by national press organs 
suggests that since the first big political corruption affair (the 1973 RTT affair) 
we find less than a hundred files of allegations of corruption (independent of the 
fact whether these cases were brought to court at all).5 In twenty cases, one or 
more public officials or entrepreneurs were put on trial with charges of active or
3 Of the EU countries, only Greece has a larger variance.
4 The development of the Dutroux affair since 1996 and the 1998 Agusta-Dassault trial will 
has further undermined people’s trust in judges and policemen as well. In fact, Belgians have 
the lowest degree of confidence in public institutions of the EU member states, and are the 
least satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (Eurobarometer 49).
5 Based on the inventory of Barrez, the inventories published by the quality papers De 





























































































passive corruption. In only eight cases, politicians were condemned6. A few 
trials are still pending7. Also, there are hardly any cases that refer to corrupt 
practices subsequent to the second law on public financing of political parties of 
1993.
Hence, in comparison with Italy, Japan and the US, we can argue that 
Belgium is a rather weak case. Still, some soft indicators of systemic corruption 
indicate that corruption was much more widespread that the ’top of the iceberg’ 
presented above may suggest. Some indicators point to regular, stable, 
organised and to some extent formalised forms of occult exchange. First there 
are indicators that at certain decision-making levels, bribes were sometimes 
expressed in fixed percentages of tenders.8 Still, in most corruption cases 
mentioned in the press, corruption deals were more ad hoc, the size of the bribe 
being decided each time by the contracting parties, rather than referring to a 
fixed, "normal" or "just" percentage. Also, privileged access to decision-makers 
in exchange for party donations was a widespread and systemic practice.9 
Finally, during the last five years of scandalitis, most leaders of the traditional 
governing parties admitted that the 1980s were a period of I ’argent fou , of 
"grey" party financing, of a culture in many decisions could be bought or 
"fixed".10
6 RTT-Baudrin-Pepermans, Versteele, Hooge Maey, Liège Parkingmeters, Smans, UNISOP, 
Reyniers, Agusta-Dassault
7 The 'mortar shells', Falkenberg, Rozenberg, en Goderis affairs.
8 In the case of the Vanderbiest/Cools investigation, the press mentioned that Vanderbiest had 
explained to judge Ancia the existence of a Parti Socialiste corruption system: all firms that 
had tenders with the Walloon Region had to give a certain percentage (10%) to the PS, which 
was channelled through the cabinet of the minister of Walloon Subsidies Works, Waterways 
and Supplies and Local Government, a position previously held by Cools himself. Also, some 
accused politicians and top civil servants were nicknamed "Mister 5%" or "Mister 10%" 
(Sauviller & Ilegems, 1997:108).
9 Scheyven, who was for 40 years the treasurer of the 'eternal' governing party CVP-PSC, 
declared that in order to collect campaign resources for his party, he "taxed" enterprises that 
had obtained, in the previous legislative term, public tenders according to the total amount of 
tenders received. In exchange, he offered a private meeting of the sponsors with a minister of 
their choice, who was informed about the generosity of the sponsor. The most important 
sponsors were invited to the private mansion of the treasurer for a meeting with the PM and 
the ministers of Finance and Economy. Also Cools, the leader of the Socialist party used to 
call post-electoral contact meetings between his ministers and the main sponsors of the party. 
During the interviews made within the framework of our research projects on MPs, ministers 
and mayors, sometimes spontaneous reference was made to attempts of bribing of the 
respondents in their quality of local official, especially concerning the modification of 
building legislation and territorial planning.




























































































B. MOST FREQUENT FORMS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
IN BELGIUM
1. Services Offered by the Public Sector
An inspection of the mechanisms of corrupt exchange mentioned in the 
allegations of corruption are not very different from those used in other 
countries. They include:
Manipulation of Public Tenders
i
• violation or subjective interpretation of public tender stipulations, when a 
decision-maker is allowed to take into account (apart from cost-benefit) a 
multitude of factors, including economic spill-over for national, regional 
or local economy;11
• transformation of tenders from the type that requires public tender to 
those that can be concluded underhand (including the splitting of the 
tender in smaller parts that do not require public calls for tender12)
• attribution of tenders to formally - but fictitious - cheapest bidder 
(decision-makers leak information about prices offered by competitors to 
the firm they protect, so that the latter can offer the cheapest price and 
win the tender, knowing that subsequently the decision-makers will allow 
the firm to bring up the price to proper levels by presenting unforeseen 
supplementary costs);
• setting up fictitious competition, when ghost companies linked to the 
protected company introduce price bids that are higher than the one of the 
protected, making the protected win the competition;
• manipulation of tender stipulations in terms of deadlines, formal 
requirements, etc;
• selling of public enterprises under market value;
• reimbursement for fictitious services rendered: contractors are allowed to 
introduce reimbursement claims for services they did not render.
11 A Minister of Public Works who held the office for a long time acknowledged during a trial 
that he had received funds for his party from a businessman in return for tenders not awarded 
according to proper procedures. He declared that it was common practice. He was not 
condemned for his remarks, nor was there any inquiry ordered to reform this sector. The 
accepted practice in this sector, from the local to the national level, is for payments to be made 
’under the counter’... (Le Soir, March 9, 1983:6)




























































































• modification of the territorial planning bills, converting agricultural and 
fauna territory into industrial and residential areas;13
Conflict Management
• judicial interventions: intervention of politicians in judicial procedures 
concerning conflicts between contractors and the state, and between 
private enterprises
• arbitration: intervention of politicians in the bilateral bargaining between 
enterprises and the state on assessment of the damages one of the parties 
suffered due to violation of tender stipulations14.
Offering Impunity and Penalty Reductions
• through upholding parliamentary immunity, many shady dealings cannot 
be investigated in depth, as the main protagonists are not interrogated;15
• through the party politicisation of the judiciary (see below) and the 
possibility to slow down judicial procedures to withhold the necessary 
resources or to promote investigating judges, etc., political parties can - 
through their nominees at all levels of the judiciary (see below) - 
discourage judiciary activism in uprooting corruption cases, make 
procedural errors that will torpedo a case, close cases, or - in the rare
Changing Legislation and Decrees
13 For instance, the judicial inquiry into manipulation of the Flemish regional plans for land 
use found that 23 of the 25 were manipulated, leading to a total of 3000 falsifications (Ghijs, 
1997:68-69), involving the upgrading of land for several billion francs.
14 In the "smeerpijp" affair, a damage claim of 800 millions made by a ministry was 
transformed into a payment of 200 millions of damages to the constructor, allegedly after 
direct intervention of a CVP-party treasurer during the bargaining meeting.
15 In order to interrogate a minister or MP, the Parliament had, until 1997, to give its 
permission. In order to indict a minister, the parliament has to refer him to the Cour de 
Cassation, an exceptional procedure. Therefore, in several cases party treasurers and members 
of ministerial cabinets whose names were mentioned in corruption cases were swiftly 
promoted to MP, making it much harder to prosecute them. In the case of CVP party treasurer 
Delcroix, he was smuggled into the Senate to take his oath as coopted senator while the 
investigators of the Superior Committee of Control were looking for him for interrogation 
since several days. In the "regional planning" affair, the trial was delayed several times as 
some of the main actors (members of the ministerial cabinet) had been made senator and their 
colleagues did not want to lift their immunity in order not to disturb parliamentary activities 
(Ghijs, 1997:69). Only in cases of flagrant indicators of corruption, MPs will lift 




























































































instances that a corruption case is brought to court trial - they can help to 
downplay the charges16 or reduce the penalties;17
2. Services Offered by the Private Sector
Apart from direct "under the counter" gifts to individual decision-makers, the 
private sector has been accused of rewarding politicians and civil servants in the 
following ways:
• monetary donations to party treasures;
• politico-functional rewards in kind: personnel and housing paid by 
companies but at the service of the politicians;
• direct gifts to the party periodical (or frequently indirectly payment 
through the purchase of overpriced advertising space);
• indirect campaign contributions through the payment of advertising, 
opinion surveys, printing, broadcasting expenses of party or politicians, 
or when the corrupting firm is active in the communications sector, 
offering free use of campaign resources in exchange for tenders in the 
past or future18;
• direct monetary gifts to the party research centres and indirect gifts (for 
instance by ordering overpriced or entirely fictitious research projects;
• rewards in kind. These can be as private as leisure trips disguised as 
research trips for politicians, civil servants and their relatives, wining and 
dining, tickets for V.I.P seating in sports stadiums, cars, furniture, free 
luxury vacations using the pnvate property of the entrepreneurs, and help 
in forming and/or maintaining extramarital relations (Sauviller & 
Ilegems, 1997:104).
16 In Belgian penal law it is quite difficult to prove that corruption really occurred, as one has 
to demonstrate that the payment of money has influenced the decision of the public official, or 
in other words that a deal or promise to pay bribes has been struck before the decision is 
formally taken. Having received money afterwards is not sufficient proof.
17 In most cases of fraud concerning public tenders, the penalty is a simple indemnization. 
Ministers will not beheld politically responsible for manipulation of tenders as in most cases 
the minister is not in charge anymore, the case has legally expired, and most MPs are not 
genuinely interested exploiting these violations (see below).
18 For instance, often the personal campaign of ministers would be in the hands of the same 
public relations company that also was in charge of the information campaigns of the ministry. 




























































































IL CAUSES AND FACILITATORS OF CORRUPTION 
IN THE BELGIAN PARTITOCRACY
Apart from the numerous structural factors that facilitate political corruption in 
the Belgian partitocracy, one should not neglect the strong impact of a rather 
’uncivic’ political culture.
A. CULTURAL FACILITATORS
1. At the Level of the Public at Large
a) Permissiveness Towards Breaches of Public Interest 
(1) Towards Corruption and Fraud
Belgians are reputed to have uncivic attitudes concerning tax fraud. According 
to the European Values Study, in 1981 only the French were more permissive of 
tax fraud than Belgians. In 1990 this permissiveness had further increased, 
making them the European leader.19 *Also the size of the black economy is one 
of the highest in Europe. Also the EVS surveys indicate that permissiveness
towards taking bribes at one’s work is considerably higher than the European
20average.
(21 Towards Breaking the Law in General
These uncivic attitudes towards different types of financial fraud are part of a 
larger culture of legal alienation. The analysis of Gibson and Caldeira indicates 
that Belgians find (more than the European average) that "it is rare that the law 
is on my side; usually I find laws to be restrictive and against my interests" and 
"if you don’t particularly agree with law, it is all right to break it if you are 
careful not to get caught".
(3) Clientelism and Constituency Service
Many observers have pointed to the importance of clientelism in the relation 
between Belgian voters and their elected representatives. Empirical research 
does in fact indicate that serving the constituency, in an individual and 
collective way, was considered by voters as well as MPs as the or one of the 
main roles of elected representatives (De Winter, 1985). Extrapolations on the 
basis of surveys amongst MPs and mayors (De Winter, 1992; Ackaert 1998) 
allow us to estimate the size of the "service for votes" exchange network at
19 The survey of Field Research of 1997 (published in La Dernière Heure) indicated that 61% 
of the Belgians did not feel moral scruples about tax fraud.





























































































about one out of four voters having appealed to the clientelistic services of 
elected officials. About half of these clients vote for the politician they 
contacted. Still, the size of the clientelistic network21, as well as the electoral 
return for services rendered seems to be in decline, due to the bankruptcy of the 
public sector, and a shift towards higher public standards and adoption of 
specific rules of conduct (De Winter and Brans, 1999). Given these uncivic 
attitudes, it comes as no surprise that the widely publicised corruption cases of 
the 1990s have hardly (until now) influenced voting behaviour, and if it did, if 
was in favour of the accused party (Billiet, Beerten & Swyngedouw, 1996).
b) Political Control Attitudes
For citizens to be able to play a role in the fight against corruption they have to 
keep the elected officials accountable. This requires alert citizens who are 
interested and well informed about political life. Belgian citizens display 
political attitudes that make them less inclined to control their elected 
representatives. First their level of interest in politics is amongst the lowest in 
the EU (Gabriel & Brettschneider, 1992:544; De Winter, 1998). Their level of 
knowledge of basic political facts (like the party composition of the coalition in 
power) is generally weak (Maddens & Dewachter, 1993) and their sense of 
internal and external political efficacy is amongst the lowest in Europe. They 
display the highest level of distrust in political institutions (with the exception 
of the media that are remarkably highly trusted), a high dose of political 
cynicism towards politicians and distrust in fellow citizens. Finally, within the 
EU public, they are the least supportive of political and socio-cultural 
democratic rights and freedoms (De Winter, 1998).
21 Demands for assistance vary enormously in content. In 1983 as well as in 1996, the most 
frequent demands concerned employment, which includes general demands for a job as well 
as for political support for recruitment and promotion in the civil service. Nearly seven out of 
ten Representatives reported this sector as the most important in 1983 and eight out of ten in 
1996! The second most important sector relates to income problems, generally to obtaining a 
(or a higher) social security transfer (like pensions, child allowances, etc.). The third sector is 
housing, which includes social housing as well as obtaining building permissions. In 1983 
problems related to the army constituted a sector of average importance but became the least 
important in 1996, probably due to the fact that compulsory military service was abolished in 
1993. However, we find, in 1996, as fourth most important category police and justice 
(immigration, legal assistance, prisoners, and annulment of traffic fines), a sector that came 
last in 1983. Then we find three sectors of about equal and rather stable importance: taxes 
(problems with tax declaration, tax evasion and overtaxing); education, culture, and leisure 
(which basically concern problems of obtaining scholarships); and family problems (divorce, 
juvenile delinquency, adoption). Problems of transport and communication (telephone, road 
works and security) have lost prominence (dropping from the 7th to the 9th place), probably 
due to the quasi-privatisation of the public telephone company. Before it was common to call 




























































































2. At the Level of Political Elites
Apart from their inclination towards clientelist service responsiveness towards 
the individual constituents, Belgian politicians also engage massively in 
collective allocative responsiveness activities. They perceive this as an 
important extraparliamentary role (De Winter, 1997:136).
Given the strong impact of Belgian parties on executive decision-making 
(see below), MPs can through contacts with ministers, their cabinets, party 
nominated civil servants, etc. play a very manipulative role in the executive 
decision-making process. They thus satisfy demands of individual constituents 
as well as of the collective constituency.
Due to this prominence of pork barrel politics in the role definition of 
politicians and of voters, and the large opportunities politicians have for 
satisfying the collective needs22 of their constituency, Belgian political elites are 
more vulnerable to corruption offers. Hence, part of the pay-off is expressed in 
large investments of the contracting enterprises in the constituency of the 
decision-makers.23
3. Entrepreneurial Political Culture
Also the entrepreneurial culture is promoting occult exchange. Belgian 
enterprise culture is strongly based on informal contacts, flexibility and 
willingness to bend business rules. This particular business culture is one of the 
causes of the size of the hidden economy which is among the largest in Europe. 
Second, the analysis of Lambsdorf (1997) indicates that Belgium companies 
abroad show a high propensity to pay bribes for contract acquisition at the 
international level.
"  De Winters (1992) parliamentary survey showed that a large majority of MPs succeeded in 
attracting governmental subsidies for communication and transport infrastructure works (like 
roads, ports, rail, and telephone connections) and governmental and private investments 
stimulating the economic development and employment in their constituency. About one out 
of three was able to provide collective provisions with regard to the service sector 
(infrastructure relating to the educational, health, cultural and sport sectors). One in five 
managed to solve urbanisation and housing problems, and a little less referred to problems 
with regard to the environment and physical security.
■ For instance, in the Agusta-affair, one of the payoffs was the promise of Agusta to build 






























































































a) Political Finance Needs
(1) Growing Needs Due to Growing Expenditures
One of the main reasons of the expansion of the occult financing of parties and 
politicians in the 1970s and 1980s is undoubtedly the professionalisation of 
party organisation and communication. This period has been characterised by 
more professional management of and communication with the rank-and-file 
membership (through central data management, membership periodicals, mass 
leisure activities), the formation of party policy and campaign technicians, the 
professionalisation of party leadership positions (requiring a personal 
secretariat, chauffeurs, housing in the capital, expense accounts, etc.).24
Expenditures rose most uncontrollably in the sector of electoral campaign 
costs. According to calculations made on the basis of estimates of the size of 
campaign efforts,25 the overall campaign costs rose from 218 million in 1974 to 
969 billion in 1987.26 Since then, due to the introduction of campaign 
restrictions and more transparent party accounting, it stabilised around that 
level.27
This exponential growth of campaign expenses is basically due to:
a) professionalisation of campaigns by hiring professional campaign 
managers and their services instead of party rank-and-file campaigners,
b) the personafication of the campaign: in spite of the fact that technically 
preference voting does not affect a candidate’s chances for election (as
24 According to the testimonies in the Agusta-trial, the former chairmen of the PS and PSC 
received in the 1980s from their party treasurer, monthly, about 100.000 BF (2.500 Euro) as 
an expense account ’under the counter’.
25 Expenditure and income data provided by the parties themselves in that period is either 
unreliable or non-existent (Deschouwer, 1992).
20 This in spite of the fact that no purchase of broadcasting time is allowed on public and 
private TV and that parties represented in parliament (and under certain conditions non- 
parliamentary parties as well) are allocated free broadcasting time on the public network, in a 
quasi-proportional way (often slightly to the benefit of the smaller parties).




























































































this is determined by his place on the list28), a good score in preference 
votes is beneficial for the place one receives on the lists, prestige within 
and beyond the party and one’s chances for executive office. Hence, in 
most corruption allegations, we finds traces of direct payments to 
important electoral leaders, either directly, or through payment to the 
party treasurer with mention of the politician to be sponsored.29
(2) Sources of Income
(a) Collective Party Income.
Clearly, the traditional forms of resource raising30 were not sufficient to meet 
the rising costs of party functioning in the 1970s and 1980s. A comprehensive 
system of public financing covering extra-parliamentary parties was established 
only in 1989 (Van Bunder, 1993). Before then, tax-deductible donations could 
only be made to the party research centres and, since 1985, to specially created 
party treasury funds. The 1989 legislation on public financing of parties 
mandated that all parties represented in both chambers would receive a lump 
sum plus an additional amount for each vote they received in the last legislative 
elections. A number of new regulations were introduced in order to decrease the 
overall costs of campaigning per party and per candidate. A number of 
campaign techniques were also prohibited. Tax deductible gifts were first 
limited, before being prohibited altogether in 1993. The 1993 law filled some
28 There are generally two alternative ways of casting votes: a list vote, endorsing the order of 
candidates on the list that is presented, and a preference vote. Every candidate whose number 
of preference votes reaches the eligibility figure (calculated by dividing the party’s total 
constituency vote by the number of seats it won, plus one) receives a seat. Usually, only those 
candidates at the top of party lists manage to win such a large number of votes. If the head of 
the list receives fewer preference votes than this, list votes are added to his preference votes 
until the required number is reached. This procedure is repeated for the second candidate on 
the list, and so on until all the party’s seats have been allocated. However, if all list votes were 
needed before all the seats have been assigned, then the remaining seats are given to those 
remaining candidates who have the largest number of preference votes. In practice, voters 
rarely manage to alter the ordered list (in less than 1% of all MPs elected since World War I) 
in spite of the fact that preference voting has increased tremendously (from 16% in 1919 to 
56% in 1995). Thus, as a consequence of the seat-allocation procedure, voters decide only on 
the number of seats a party gets, whereas the parties themselves decide who will occupy them. 
The size of a candidate’s ’personal vote’does not affect his chances of being elected.
"9 For instance, most money paid by Agusta to the SP was channelled by the party treasurer to 
the persons heading electoral lists in the main constituencies (De Morgen, August 26,1998).
10 Traditional sources of party income are membership dues (still about one out of ten voters 
is a party member), contributions from elected officials (ranging from 8 % for the Francophone 
Socialists to as much as 50 % for the Francophone Greens) and from parliamentary parties -  





























































































gaps and closed some loopholes, but most importantly almost quadrupled 
subsidies.
Responsibility for ensuring that these campaign restrictions are followed 
rests with a parliamentary committee, which receives reports from the heads of 
the central constituencies’ voting boards. Up until now, very few complaints 
have been notified to the committee, most by referring to ministers that abuse 
departmental PR for personal promotion. In addition, in most cases of campaign 
violations, it is seems difficult to sufficient proof that can lead to a verdict and 
withdrawal of subsidies. Finally also here parties seem to be rather lenient 
towards each other’s breaches of (the philosophy of) the public finance 
legislation.
(b) Public Decision-makers’ Sources of Personal Income
Low pay for public officials (a commonly used economic argument to explain 
corruption) does not work as an explanation for the apparent willingness of 
Belgian public elites to accept bribes and grey forms of political finance. 
Belgian MPs, higher civil servants and judges are paid more or less average in 
comparison with their European and other colleagues (expressed in Purchasing 
Power Parity) (Brans, 1994, 1996).31 However, the gap with top private pay is 
clear, as the average general manager earns almost twice as much as an MP.32 
Bonuses and performance premiums would further widen the gap. Contrary to 
suggestions of recent, cross-national executive remuneration studies (Hood & 
Lambert, 1994:39-40), it cannot be said that the gap has widened over the last 
decade (De Winter & Brans, 1999).
31 In 1996, the base allowance stood at 2,529,162 BF. The 1996 income structure of MPs 
comprises base allowances, intrinsic office rewards in cash and kind, formal post-service 
benefits such as pensions and severance pay, and outside-earning opportunities. Up until 1996, 
half of this allowance was exempt from taxes, as a means to offset members’ professional 
expenses. Allowances are now fully taxed, but this was compensated for by a lump sum expense 
allowance (of 28 % of the allowance). There are three further deductions from base allowances: 
pension contributions, economic crisis contributions, and party contributions. MPs receive a 
range of intrinsic office rewards, some in cash, others in kind (Brans, 1994, 1996). A 
comparison of pay differentials for top positions in both the public and private sector (based on 
base salaries, holiday pay and end of year premium) indicates that cabinet members earn twice 
as much as ordinary backbenchers; top civil servants earn one third and top judges two thirds 
more than MPs. Overall though, civil servants and judges have few outside earning 
opportunities. So do Cabinet members, for which a wider range of intrinsic office rewards, such 
as official cars and housing facilities, compensates this comparative income disadvantage.
32 The 75th percentile manager gains 2,5 times the MP’s salary and the very top (95 percentile) 




























































































b) Electoral System and Behaviour
As argued above, the electoral system as such, based on proportional 
representation with an medium degree of disproportionality, does not contribute 
significantly to the corrupt behaviour of elected officials and parties. Also the 
political relevance of preference voting is weak in comparison to Italy or Japan, 
given the fact that in Belgium, MPs are hardly ever elected by virtue of their 
preferences votes. Their election depends on their place on the party list.
c) Party Organisational Features
Selective Incentives for Party and Political Participation
Belgian parties, especially the traditional ones, have managed, until recently, to 
keep high levels of membership. The overall ratio members/voters has even 
grown between the early 1960s and the end of the 1980s, from 7.8 to 9.2%33 
(Katz & Mair, 1994). Hence, until the 1990s, there is not discernible crisis of 
the mass-party model. The number of party members of the traditional parties 
(except the VLD) has however gone down steadily in the 1990s (Delwit & De 
Waele, 1997).
It is difficult to capture to what extent there has been a shift in the 
incentives stimulating these high levels of party membership, as no general 
party membership survey has ever been carried out. Still, some partial data does 
indicate that selective material incentives have been important. First, party 
membership/voters ratio is positively related to the parties’ participation in 
government. In addition, constituency case work case studies indicate that the 
number of clients calling for an MPs intervention declines sharply once his 
party is out of power. And it was common practice that persons who received 
important services (like a job or promotion in the civil service), were asked to 
contribute to the MP’s or the party campaign fund and to become a party 
member. These party member/clients represent loyal troops which can be 
mobilised during the intraparty primary (poll) or constituency party conferences 
which decide on the selection of candidates. Also, the overall degree of 
identification has gone down from 27% in 1978 to 18.2% in 1994. During this 
period, party identification in Belgium has always been below the European 
average.34
’’ This in spite of the large drop of support for the traditional parties that generally have a 
much higher degree of encadrement (from 90.5% in 1961 to 64.1% in 1999).
,J Whether this low identification and gradual decline is only due to the weak(ening) of the 




























































































d) Party System Features
(1) Fragmentation of the Party System and Government Rotation 
The Belgian party and government system displays features of core stability as 
well as strong volatility. From 1958 to 1999, the Christian-democrats have 
uninterruptedly been in power at the federal as well as the regional level, mainly 
in coalition with the socialists and to a lesser extent the liberals.35 But also the 
newcomers to the party system (at least the three regionalist parties) had 
sporadically their share of governing power (De Winter, 1998). The splitting of 
the three traditional parties in a Flemish and Francophone one in the 1970s and 
the breakthrough of other newcomers in the 1980s has not only made the 
Belgian party system the most fragmented one of Europe (the number of 
effective parties reached a new peak in 1999 (9.1) but already in 1991 13 parties 
were represented in the House, De Winter & Dumont, 1999). This 
fragmentation expresses a multitude of cleavages and issue dimensions: left- 
right, clerical-anticlerical, regional-linguistic, materialist-postmaterialist, 
system-antisystem. It is important to understand that there are no national 
parties left in Belgium, i.e. parties that run candidates in all 20 constituencies. 
All parties are homogeneously Flemish or Francophone, and only run for office 
in Flemish or Francophone constituencies.36
35 From a two party system during most of the 19th century, when the Catholic and Liberal 
parties opposed each other across the religious divide, the Belgian party system turned into a 
three-party type with the Socialist breakthrough and the emergence of a socio-economic 
cleavage at the end of the century. It remained that way until at least 1965. The parties’ 
relative strength varied considerably throughout the period, but most of the time the three 
‘traditional’ parties (Christian-Democrats, Socialists and Liberals) together received more 
than 90% of the total vote and alternately shared governmental offices in different coalition 
combinations. In the 1960s and 1970s, the number of parties represented in Parliament rose 
dramatically. The linguistic-regional parties (Volksunie in Flanders, Rassemblement Wallon in 
Wallonia, and Front Démocratique des Francophones in the Brussels region) came first and 
even entered governmental coalitions in the 1970s. The growing saliency of the linguistic and 
regional cleavage divided the Christian-Democrat, Liberal and Socialist parties, and each 
traditional party split into two organisationally and programmatically independent Flemish 
and French-speaking branches (in 1968, 1972, and 1978 respectively). At the end of the 1970s 
came the Flemish ulra-nationalist and anti-migrant Vlaams Blok, the poujadist Union 
Démocratique pour le Respect du Travail, and the Green parties (AGAI.F.V in Flanders and 
ECOLO in the Francophone areas). Thus, by 1981 fourteen parties were represented in 
Parliament. During the 1980s, the Communists, the RW and the UDRT lost their last 
representatives in Parliament. The 1991 general election introduced the latest newcomers, the 
Francophone extreme-right Front National, and the libertarian ROSSEM (which did not run 
in the 1995 and 1999 elections as the founder was imprisoned for fraud).




























































































The government system is also highly fragmented: since 1973 four to six 
small and middle-sized parties37 participate in government. This extreme 
fragmentation of executive power, and the highly collective nature of cabinet 
decision-making (Frognier, 1997) should in principle deflate corruption 
practices as the number of decision-makers - therefore the potential of mutual 
control by whistle-blowers - increased drastically in comparison of the single 
party or two-party governments of the 1950s and 1960s. While in the 1960s and 
early 1970s, co-operation in the field of occult party finance between governing 
parties seems to have occurred regularly38, in the subsequent period, corruption 
deals were usually set-up by one party only. Therefore, the expansion of the 
occult financing of political parties in the 1970s and 1980s coincided with a 
drastic increase of party fragmentation and government volatility, not during a 
period of stable party monopoly or duopoly of executive power.
In spite of considerable government volatility, there was also a strong 
element of government stability, as the strongest party family was nearly 
uninterruptedly in power, changing regularly coalition partners. As such - given 
the pivotal power of Christian-democrats when Socialists or Liberals were in 
opposition, their opposition tended to be rather lukewarm, as they knew that a 
too strong head-on opposition would be sanctioned by the CVP-PSC that could 
keep the denouncers another legislative term out of power.39
37 The largest party in government, the VLD, obtained 14.3% of the national vote at the 1999 
elections.
38 The treasurer of the CVP-PSC declared that he and the treasurer of another party swapped 
some of their names so that ’we do not forget such and such a person or group in order to get 
the necessary funds (Le Soir, March 9, 1983:6). According to Coeck & Willems (1994) and 
Sauviller & Uegems (1997), Vandenboeynants and Cools, the strong men of the PSC and PS 
in the 1970s and early 1980s and major fundraisers, had a perfect understanding in 
manipulating national defence tenders, leading to a high conjuncture in political corruption. 
Their willingness to share may explain why in that period very few corruption cases were 
discovered or brought to trial. These two politicians were removed from their power position 
in national politics only in the early 1980s. Still, even then period there seems to have existed 
a non-aggression pact. In the investigation of the Agusta-trial, a note was found, formulated 
by the main advisor of the PSC-vice PM in the sector of large public tenders. It said that the 
Agusta tender seem to be steered by "a socialist mafia" but the advisor told his minister not to 
intervene, as this would give the PSC more influence in future army tenders (Coeck & 
Willems, 1994:186).
39 This was the fate of the Flemish Liberals that through their populist and anti-Christian pillar 




























































































Therefore, in spite of convincing indicators of widespread and well- 
organised occult financing of the CVP-PSC40 in the 1970s and 1980s, the other 
traditional parties are reluctant to exploit these disclosures. Also in the 1995 
and 1999 campaigns, the other parties have underexploited the Agusta-Dassault 
case that involved the non-pivotal Socialists.
This suggests in fact the existence of non-denunciation and retaliation 
pacts between traditional parties, as all have corpses of past illicit party finance 
in their closet. In addition, there is the justified fear that an escalation in 
corruption disclosure will only be beneficial to the extreme right41 (Vlaams Blok 
and Front National), that openly politicise and campaign on the issue of mani 
pulite. For the same reason, also the Green parties - that hitherto are not 
involved in corruption - have refrained from politicising the issue of political 
corruption.
(21 Low Turnover Decision Makers
Hindriks (1996) suggests that a low turnover of decision-makers is instrumental 
to political corruption. However, turnover of Belgian political elites has been 
traditionally high, at least in general terms. On the basis of fragmented 
evidence42, one can conclude that parliamentary seniority has decreased 
considerably in the post-war period.43 After the 1995 elections, the average 
number of years of parliamentary experience is 5.51 years for the House, 6.9 
years for the Senate (Depauw, 1997:209). Also the average ministerial career is 
quite short in comparative perspective (3.7 years) and the number of years on a 
given ministerial post is even lower (2.1 years) (De Winter, 1990:75&93). Such 
short careers are dysfunctional for setting up an efficient network of corrupt 
exchange.
40 The two most instructive books on occult party financing, based on internal documents of 
the party treasurer concerned the CVP (Fransen & Martens; Sauviller & Ilegems). None of the 
other traditional parties tried to politically exploit the publication of these books.
41 At the 1995 general elections, the extreme right parties taken together obtained more than 
10% of the national vote.
42 Fiers (1998) mentions an overall average of 9.0 years for Representatives in the 1946-1992 
period and 7.7 for the Senate. After the 1978 elections, the incumbency of Representatives 
was 7.7 years (De Winter, 1992:201).
43 This is partially due to the growing fragmentation of the party system which not only brings 
representatives of new parties for the first time into parliament, but also makes more seats 
marginal in each constituency - and this for all parties - due the effects of the second tier 




























































































However, the most central figures in occult financing of parties are not 
ministers, let alone MPs, but the chefs de cabinet and the party treasurers.44 The 
top collaborators of the cabinet ministériel (see below) often remain in their 
position when the minister changes, at least when the ministry remains in the 
hands of the same party. Also most national party treasurers have a career that is 
longer than the ministerial one, and some even had an extremely long service.45 
This office-holding stability is instrumental to generating and managing trust 
between parties involved in corruption practices and the role of parties in 
sanctioning political corruption and credit agencies.
(3) De-ideologisation of Main Political Parties
Della Porta (1999) suggests that political corruption occurs more with cartel 
parties with fluid ideology that can not mobilise a stable constituency on 
ideological grounds and need money to mobilise supporters. The thesis of the 
de-ideologisation of main political parties has regularly been evoked in 
Belgium. Research on the distance of political parties in the relevant political 
dimensions (Swyngedouw, 1993:103) indicate that voters perceive little 
difference between Christian-democrats, Socialists and Liberals (as well as the 
Volksunie).46 Only the Greens and the extreme-right are perceived to differ 
significantly from the traditional parties.
However, in a long-term perspective, the 1960-1990 period gives a less 
clear-cut picture of de-ideologisation. In the 1960s, the Liberals became more 
openly a conservative party on the left-right divide, and even tended toward 
neo-liberalism in the 1980s, but switched back to the center at the end of the 
1990s (De Winter, 2000). The Socialists gradually moved to the centre-left. On 
the denominational divide, the Liberals abandoned the anti-clerical positions in 
the 1960s, while also the Christian-democrats gradually became less virulent 
defenders of traditional religious values. On the linguistic/regional divide, 
however, polarisation has been growing steadily since the 1970s, leading to a 
system of polarised pluralism (De Winter & Dumont 1999; Deschouwer, 1996) 
that can cause the breakdown of the polity. In fact, as there are no more Belgian 
parties but only Flemish and Francophone ones, each appealing to their 
linguistic constituency, there is no more a Belgian party system, but two 
autonomous and antagonistic party systems. Finally, the breakthrough of several
They are most often sitting on the banks of the accused in corruption trials, together with 
the political responsible, i.e. the ministers.
45 Scheyven was for 40 years the treasurer of the CVP-PSC. Delcroix was CVP treasurer and 
national secretary only in the 1984-1992 period, but the shortness of his office was forced by 
the judicial inquiries into his shady dealings. Mangé was SP fund collector in the 1980-1995 
period.




























































































highly ideological newcomers (ethno-regionalists, greens and extreme-right 
parties) do not suggest a generalised de-ideologisation of the party system in the 
post-war period. Hence, only for the two oldest cleavages - class and religion - 
one can in the long run discern (although non-linear) centripetal trends amongst 
the main governmental parties, and a certain fluidisation of their ideology.47
2. Supply Factors
a) Pillarisation
Della Porta (1999) argues that the invasion of parties of civil society lowers 
defences against corruption and mismanagement. A particular form of societal 
invasion is consociationalism, whereby parties act as the spokesmen of well- 
organised ideological subcultures that are well-entrenched in civil society 
through a network of pillar organisations active in most sectors of civil society. 
Not only has Lijphart (1981) considered Belgium as the best fitting case for his 
consociational ideal-type, but also contrary to other cases, the basic premises of 
the model still hold for Belgium (Luther & Deschouwer, 1999).
According to Frognier (1986), consociationalism can facilitate 
corruption. He argues that the more occult dealings between elites, the greater 
the chances for corruption. 48 Also, in a consociational democracy, political 
elites have more means to ’manage’ the reality of corruption and to minimise the 
harmful effects of the revelations of the scandals that involve them. They thus 
protect themselves from ’chains of denunciation’ which, from one particular 
scandal, may escalate and threaten to challenge the political world as a whole. It 
is likely that a consociational democracy is more susceptible than other forms of 
government to develop this type of collective response, thanks to the 
’cartelisation of elites’, their capacity to control leaders within one’s own pillar 
and to avoid conflicts that could result in chain of denunciations and ultimately 
political disaster. Thus, Frognier discerns several self-protecting mechanisms:
1) the capacity of controlling the press through self-censorship. The
Belgian press used to be strongly linked to the pillars, not only
ideologically but also in terms of interlocking directorates (De Winter,
47Although this is basically an adaptation to major societal transformations like secularisation, 
embourgeoisement of the working class and the development of the welfare state.
48 One could also argue the opposite to be true, as opening up the decision-making processes 
to several sectors in a society would lessen the need to use corruption as a functional 




























































































1981). It has often been reported that on a number of occasions they have 
refused to publish stories that involved those families.49
2) top-leaders within the pillars, such as the party presidents, have been 
able to instruct important figures, such as ministers to resign in order to 
avoid the revelations of ’scandals’, possibly inspired by opponents, or to 
stop the unfolding of a scandal which could have serious repercussions. 
One can note the use of specific sanctions such as the resignation from 
national positions and a demotion to local offices or even a temporary 
’departure’ from public life. The ultimate sanction is the permanent 
removal from political life. Frognier presumes that these interventions by 
leaders are not just internally decided but also result from the political 
trade-offs between leading members of the ’cartel of elites’.
3) the sharing of information on partners available for illegal operations 
(see footnote 38). We could also add to this the capacity to offer a 
collective informal amnesty to politicians of different parties under 
accusation.50
b) Structural Lack o f Fair competition in Public Markets Due to Regional 
Competition
The prominence of pork barrel activities of Belgian MP is related to the ’non- 
rationaf way in which public expenditures are allocated in Belgium. Given the 
ongoing conflicts between the different regions and cultural communities, 
departmental spending is carefully distributed over the regions and 
communities, so that each unit receives public investments according to its
4<) For instance, catholic De Standaard, the main Flemish quality paper, has not reported in 
depth on the revelations of the dealings of the CVP-treasurer Delcroix. Also, no Socialist 
politician (although they were on the opposition benches) exploited the links between CVP 
and capital groups unveiled by the publication of the book "The Money of the CVP” (Franssen 
& Martens, 1984). Even the socialist newspaper, De Morgen, that had launched the scoop, 
dropped the topic after one week. As CVP-president Van Peel observed (Humo 8/2/97:42): 
"Are the notebooks of party treasurer Leo Delcroix a clear example of the fixing culture of the 
1980s? The answer is yes! ... All parties were financed by enterprises and everybody new, also 
the political journalists. When the book The Money of the CVP’ came out, nobody gave a 
wimp".
50 The parliamentary committee that in 1989 had to decide whether to lift the parliamentary 
immunity of the former ministers Vanden Boeynants (PSC) and Vreven (VLD) named in 
corruption affairs, and of MP Lizin (PS) for forgery, decided that in all three cases the 
accusations did not carry enough weight. As each belonged to one of the three traditional 





























































































size.51 Hence, many projects are allocated to constituencies that normally - in 
terms of socio-economic cost/benefit calculations - would not be able to attract 
such investments. As the decisions on the allocation of public investments are 
largely based on political criteria, rather than on socio-economic cost/benefit 
calculations, politicians have a larger pork barrel market to manipulate than in 
many other countries. This method of allocating public expenditures - the so- 
called wafer iron politics - together with subsidies towards declining traditional 
industries and the rise in public employment in the 1970s are the main causes 
for the gigantic public debt (Lammens, 1993).52
Evidently, political parties and party politicians are the main actors in 
bending the rules in order to represent the special interests of their collective 
clienteles and private sponsors. Since the mid-1980s, a special cabinet 
committee comprising top ministers was created to supervise the fair regional 
allocation of public federal investments and purchases.
c) The Expansion of Organised Crime
Until recently, little was known about the existence and operation of organised 
crime in Belgium. Since 1996, a special committee follows the sector, 
publishing a yearly report. It found that 238 criminal organisations were active 
in Belgium in 1997 (162 in 1996, 90 in 1994) that made massive use of legal 
enterprises as cover. The commission found that about a fourth of these criminal 
organisations tried in that year to influence/approach/bribe policemen, judges, 
journalists, customs officers, businessmen, civil servants or politicians or 
political parties.53
51 For instance, in 1981, a socio-economic cost-benefit analysis was made of the investment 
projects with regard to roads and waterways. The analysis showed that 72% of the most 
cost/beneficial works were situated in Flanders, representing 90% of the investments. In 
Flanders, 74% would go to the province of Antwerp. The minister of Public Works declared 
that cost-benefit analysis is only one element of the decision-making, together with political, 
regional and local factors, and that the division between Flanders and Wallonia suggested by 
the study was politically unmanageable. Hence, he decided to allocate investments in a 
proportional way (Van De Walle, 1982). Undoubtedly, the same kind of situation occurs for 
investments made by most other departments, like defence, public health, education, etc.
32 Public debt is currently around 122% of the GNP. The size of this debt increasingly cripples 
the federal government in budgetary terms. Around 40% of the annual federal budget (with a 
peak of 44% in 1993) are allocated to the payments of interest on this debt.
33 With regard to the Italian mafia, the committee concluded that "non seulement les 
dirigeants de cette organisation ont réussi à acquérir une position respectable et honorable 
dans la société, mais ils se sont rendus intouchables en ayant publiquement des contacts avec 




























































































Most of these organisations were of foreign origin54, although sometimes 
present for decades on Belgian soil (like the Italian and Chinese mafia). More 
recently concerns are growing about the influx of mafias from the former Soviet 
Republics, Latin-America and Turkey. Belgium is obviously an interesting front 
position, given its central location, openness of its economy55 and borders, and 
highly underequiped56 and "permeable" administrative, judiciary and political 
system.57 Therefore, although organised crime is a relative newcomer, also on 
the corruption market, given the occult character of public market attributions, 
this new actor has found a fertile ground and can easily overtake the profits 
from "rotten markets".
3. Parties as Facilitators of Corrupt Exchange
a) Party Control of Public Decision-makers
Civil Service and Ministerial Cabinets 
(a) Politicisation of Civil Service Personnel
Through a variety of measures, parties have managed to circumvent to a 
considerable extent the normal non-partisan recruitment procedures in the civil 
service sector, which used to be among the largest of the OECD countries in 
terms of the proportion of the working population (De Winter, 1989).58 During 
the coalition talks, parties usually agree upon the nomination and promotion 
quotas allocated to each party.
54 Although there are also ’genuine’Belgian mafias: the ’cattle hormones’mafia, the Industrial 
waste’ mafia, the labour market brokers’ mafia, the Hell’s Angels, etc.
55 Not only is the Belgian economy one of the most open ones in Europe, exports constitute 
three quarters of the Gross National Product (OECD, 1996: 192-195); an increasing part of 
the productive sector passing hands from national to foreign holding companies, especially 
French ones. According to Mabille, political corruption in Belgium corresponds with the 
capture of French groups, of an important part of the Belgian economy. According to this 
thesis corruption is imported with the internationalisation of company ownership, either 
because this leads to direct adoption of a (more) corrupt model of exchange applied by the 
new owners in their own country, or due to the fact these newcomers on the Belgian public 
expenditures market lack the proper channels of influence allowing them to get a share of a 
market regulated by informal contacts.
56 There is an Office Central tie la Lutte contre la Délinquence Economique et Financière, 
that exposed a large number of cases of economic and financial fraud. Still, it is highly 
underequiped (9 detectives and 6 gendarmes-documentalistes).
57 This permeability was revealed during the investigation of the Cools-murder, where the 
ministerial cabinet of a socialist minister had been infiltrated by an Italo-belgian mafia clan 
that ran its illicit business operations from the cabinet premises.
58 During the heydays of partitocracy, the proportion of public employment in the overall 





























































































Belgian parties exert an even stronger influence on promotions in the 
public sector. Until the end of the 1980s59, the promotion of university trained 
civil servants was strongly controlled by the majority parties. For promoting 
university trained civil servants, an unofficial interparty committee was 
established in the 1970s, chaired by a collaborator of the PM.60 For each 
position, the committee considers the candidates for promotion, and the support 
each candidate enjoys from a coalition party. In principle, each coalition party 
can make nominations in proportion to its parliamentary strength. In order to 
prepare the meetings of this committee, most coalition parties have installed 
intraparty nomination committees, in which the political and professional merits 
of candidates supported by party leaders, MPs and other patrons are compared 
(De Winter, 1981; Hondeghem, 1990: 198-203). These committees usually 
include (representatives of) the party president, prominent ministers, factions, 
constituency parties, MPs and other brokers.
In several parties, the same person held the position of centraliser of 
political patronage demands and that of party fundraiser. Delcroix even added 
to this powerful mix of functions the composition of candidate list for 
legislative elections.61 Through his good contacts with the private sector and as 
patronage centraliser, he could offer deselected candidates alternative career 
paths as a consolation price. As party treasurer, he could financially sponsor his 
favoured candidates and constituency parties, thus creating a personal following 
of CVP-officials. Finally, he was also involved in the organisation of electoral 
campaigning and the media contacts of his party, including the starting-up of 
Flanders second television network VTM (Sauviller & Ilegems, 1997:259).62
Moreover, the party patronage on the public sector and society does not 
end there. In the public media sector, the promotion of the personnel of the 
public radio and television companies is subject to similar party influence. In
59 In the 1988 government agreement, the parties agreed that if the board of directors 
unanimously recommended a particular candidate, the inter-party nomination committee 
would follow this advice. Since then, these boards of top civil servants have seized this 
chance to enhance their nomination power by increasingly issuing unanimous 
recommendations, a move which shifted power over promotions from the parties to the higher 
civil service.
60 Since the fédéralisation of the national civil service, similar committees have been set up to 
monitor the patronage of the promotions of civil service of the regional and community level.
61 In this function, he was the main inspirer of the idea of moving PM Martens from his Gent 
constituency to the Brussels’ one, which some considered a first step toward his political 
liquidation. In 1992 he was even involved in the selection of ministers (Sauviller & Ilegems, 
1997:202.211).
62 According to Sauviller & Ilegems (1997:261), this explains the scarcity and restraint of 




























































































most other sectors in which parties are influential, like public education, public, 
semi-public and quasi-autonomous enterprises and services (airways, telephone, 
railroad, ferries, post, some public banks and credit institutions), local 
government, etc., parties interfere with the recruitment and promotion of 
personnel, at different levels (ranging from the janitor in a public kindergarten 
to the chairman of the board of directors of SABENA).63
(b) Degrading the Role of the Civil Service in Decision Making 
Political parties have managed, until recently64, to marginalise the role of the 
civil service in the decision making process, by creating a large and powerful 
ministerial personal staff, the so-called cabinets ministériels.65 These 
cabinetards act as the main link between the minister and his civil servants. The 
excessive use of ministerial cabinets as interface and screen66 is partially due to
63 In the 1990s several important public enterprises were given more autonomy, but in some, 
like the post office and the train company, this has not drastically reduced party patronage of 
leadership positions ((X. "Partijmensen besturen autonome post en NMBS", De Standaard, 
13-14/7/1991, p. 2; DDC, "Jacques Comet de laan uitgestuurd bij NMBS", De Morgen, 
24/7/91, p. 3; De Moor, F., "Een belletje van Belfagor", Knack, 7/4/1993, p. 38-39; Dermine, 
M. "Des gestionnaires débarquent au conseil d'administration pour veiller sur l'union Sabena- 
Air France", Le Soir, 11-12/4/1992, p. 3; Tegenbos, G. "Snelle promoties bij RTT inderdaad 
voor kabinetslui", De Standaard, 19/4/1991, p. 3).
64 Since the end of the 1980s, and especially after the shock of the 1991 ‘Black Sunday’ 
elections (i.e. the breakthrough of the extreme right) and the subsequent calls for a ‘new 
political culture’, there has been a general move towards accountability and the de­
politicisation of the civil service. At the present time, about five of six higher civil servants 
are nominated on the basis of the proposal of the departmental board of directors (Hondeghem 
1996:60). In addition, a code on the relationship between ministers and their administration 
has expanded the role of the latter. The ministerial staffs are now required to meet regularly 
with the top civil servants in their ministry. In the past, ministerial staffs tended to work with 
civil servants loyal to their party, often bypassing the hierarchical order of the department. 
Higher civil servants have been made more responsible for the management of their 
departments, are regularly evaluated and can now be sanctioned (or even loose their jobs) for 
poor performance. The role of the departmental secretary general has been enhanced with 
regard to budgeting, personnel policy and policy implementation. A college of secretary- 
generals advises the government and plays a co-ordinating role in matters that concern several 
departments (De Ryck 1994:473-475). As a consequence, ministers now tend to have much 
more direct contact with their top civil servants. The emancipation of the higher civil service 
has been enhanced by the reduction of the size of the ministerial cabinets by a third, basically 
due to the introduction of a constitutional amendment limiting the number of ministers to 15.
65 The number of cabinetards involved in policy making has grown from 108 in 1953 to 325 
in 1986 (and decreased to 235 in 1995), while their overall number has increased from 750 in 
1960 to 2000 in 1987 (Hondeghem 1996:55; Dewachter, 1992:238).
66 Dienckx and Majersdorf's (1993:96) survey on communication networks of higher civil 
servants indicate that in comparison with the six countries included in the Aberbach, Putnam 




























































































the high degree of party politicisation of the civil service, which often creates 
tensions when top civil servants belong to a different party than their minister’s. 
Given this encompassing politicisation, ministers feared that they could not 
unconditionally rely on the loyalty of their civil servants. Hence, until the 
beginning of the 1990s, most policy development, verification of policy 
implementation and mediation with interest groups was carried out by 
ministerial cabinets (Hondegem 1996: 51-58). The role of the civil service, 
including high civil servants, was basically reduced to providing these cabinets 
with the information necessary for policy planning, to the implementation of 
governmental decisions and to management of the department (exception made 
for personnel policy, that was also controlled by the ministerial cabinets). 
Hence, civil servants generally do not serve as a source of external control and 
vigilance on the application of correct decision-making norms.
Many of the ministerial cabinet members do not participate in 
governmental work. Especially those at lower levels exercise clientelist 
functions with regard to the minister’s electoral constituency. In addition, 
cabinets are a way to procure free staff to the party headquarters.67 They also 
donate a part of their salary to the party treasurer.68
Many of these cabinetards rotate between the ministerial cabinets and 
civil service. Cabinet service does quicken promotion in the civil service, while 
the civil service serves as a waiting room for politically active civil servants 
awaiting new missions in a ministerial cabinet (while their supporting party is in 
opposition).69 Also pantouflage to the semi-public or private sector is common. 
A similar exchange operates between ministerial cabinets on the one hand, and 
the judiciary and the public enterprises70 on the other.
with their ministers, due to the interface role of the ministerial cabinets.
67 Party president Deprez admitted that for each PSC-cabinet, about 5 members were diverted 
for working directly for the party. Hence in total, the PSC ’privatised’ about 50 cabinet 
collaborators. Also other governing parties admitted that this was common practice, and only 
due to the more strict application of the law on public finance, party presidents have by now 
"regularised" the status of most of their "submarine” personnel.
68 In the PSC, a part of this donation could be recuperated by introducing reimbursement 
claims for fictive expenses.
69 For instance, in the period 1975-1985, more than half of the director-generals of the 
corruption sensitive ministry of Public Works had been previously a member of a ministerial 
cabinet (Dewachter, 1992:237).
70 In the 1990s several important public enterprises have been given more autonomy (airways, 




























































































Since 1981a large number of federal public enterprises, services and 
administrations have been transferred to the regions and the communities, and 
at these levels were often created from scratch, allowing for massive 
circumventions of the normal statutory recruitment proceedings.71 Hence, 
political parties managed to nominate their trustees - very often senior members 
of ministerial cabinets - in the various new public administrations and 
enterprises at the subfederal level.
The ministerial cabinets are evidently useful sites for organising occult 
political exchange. Therefore, contrary to the Italian case, Belgian public and 
party officials do not need to establish private headquarters, personal 
secretariats or research centres, that offer more privacy than the official party 
headquarters (Della Porta, 1999). In addition, they can also use the premises of 
the wide network of lodges and service clubs of different denomination 
(Catholic, Masonic, Belgian, Flemish, Francophone, left and right wing, etc.), 
which try to increase the usefulness to their members by including 
representatives from different sectors of society (lawyers, judges, politicians, 
tax councillor, doctors, pharmacists, etc)(Ghijs, 1997:47).
(c) Politicisation of the Judiciary
Likewise, the recruitment and promotion of judges was nearly completely 
determined by party patronage. Until recently, the preliminary training of judges 
was non-existent or rudimentary, giving the party actors a large leeway in 
nominating their protégés. Here again, we can notice a centralisation of 
patronage in the 1970s, with the creation of intraparty selection committee. 
Interested candidates had to apply there for party backing. Bargaining between 
governing parties in inter-party committees chaired by a representative of the 
minister of Justice was also institutionalised.
In 1991 entry into the judiciary became subject to exams and a formation 
stage was envisaged, but the minister can still freely choose between the 
candidates that pass the tests. Only in 1998 was it decided to depoliticise the
usually reduced to 51% or even less. Hence, the private sector’s participation puts a break on 
too strong direct interference of ministers and their party headquarters with policy making and 
especially personnel recruitment in these sectors. During this transfer and setting up of new 
services, objective recruitment rules were even less respected than before.
1 According to the 1988 agreement between the parties supporting the Flemish executive, the 
CVP got 40% of the nominations, the SP 30%, and the VU 15%. The remaining 15% were 
left to liberal or neutral candidates (PVDD "Vlaamse kabinetschefs hanteren telmachinetjes 




























































































promotion of judges, by transferring the Minister of Justice’s nomination 
competence to a more neutral and pluralist Conseil de la Magistrature,12
b) Controlling Sources o f Exposure
One of the main problems of the weak role of corruption controlling instances is 
that due to the party politicisation of the public sector, the controllers are often 
controlled by or tributary to the controlled.
(a) The Superior Committee of Control
The Conseil Supérieur de Contrôle, the state official anti-corruption service, 
has not been able to perform its role adequately, for a variety of reasons. It was 
traditionally underequiped, as a dozen of civil servants had, with preventive 
objectives, scrutinise about 3000 public tenders per year. Its resources were 
even systematically decreased once it became pro-actively involved in the 
investigation into the wave of corruption case of the early 1990s. Its 
administrative hierarchy was highly party politicised, the two top positions 
controlled by the CVP and PS, that were indebted for their nomination to these 
parties’ treasurers and patronage dispatchers (Delcroix and Hermanus 
respectively). Also at lower levels, the CSC was politicised, producing many 
leaks of information on ongoing inquiries to the media as well as to the parties 
and politicians under suspicion.
After a series of modifications of its competencies and status, in 1998 
most of the Committee services were transferred to the Justice ministry, 
constituting the new Office Central pour la Repression de la Corruption. The 
rest was transferred to the new section on state tenders and subsidies within the 
federal Civil Service department. These modifications are generally considered 
to have weakened this service’s role in the fight against corruption.72 3
(b) The Inspection of Finance
To every ministerial department are attached one or more inspectors of finance, 
acting as the financial and budgetary councillor of the minister. They verify the
72 When in 1996 a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the Dutroux affair had to be set 
up, many MPs had to be rejected as committee member, as they had first and second degree 
family links with the judges that had been criticised for lack of activism or blunders. Also the 
lack of progress in the judicial inquiry in the 'mortar shells’ affair was blamed for the fact that 
the judge that had been in charge was nominated by the Liberals, the party of the minister and 
cabinetards under accusation (Barrez, 1997:267).
73 The administrateur général of the service, who in 1996 before a Senate investigative 
committee on organised crime, had denounced 50 cases (involving five ministers), in which 
the Superior Committee of Investigation had not managed to pursue its inquiry (allegdedly 




























































































legality and opportunity of the conditions of the tenders before the public 
announcement as well as when the choice between contractors is to be made. 
Often, these inspectors belong to the party of the minister. In addition a part of 
their supplementary monthly income is dependent on the positive appreciation 
made by the minister they control. Inspectors that create too much trouble for 
their minister are sometimes transferred to another ministry.
(cl The Parliamentary Audit Office
Every year, the parliamentary Audit Office (Cour des Comptes) has to produce 
a financial report, which is introduced as a bill to Parliament in October of the 
following fiscal year. While the vote on this bill was originally intended to 
assess governmental policy, in practice this approval usually occurs several 
years later, rendering the vote a mere formality, as the responsible government 
or minister is usually not anymore in office. In addition, the Audits Office’s 
reports cover only the regularity and legality of governmental expenditures, and 
not their efficacy. Finally, the MPs themselves are usually uninterested in the 
report of the Audit office74 in spite of the fact that the media usually manage to 
report the most shocking parts (the so-called Blunderbooks).
(d~) Parliamentary Committees of Investieation
Parliamentary committees of investigation have the same powers as an 
examining magistrate, including use of coercion and questioning witnesses 
under oath. Until the 1980s, such committees were quite uncommon in Belgian 
parliamentary life. This was because majority MPs -  in solidarity with the 
government -  were reluctant to allow investigations which could embarrass a 
specific minister or the entire government. In addition, even when a committee 
of inquiry suggested that a minister was politically responsible for certain 
failures, the minister did not resign as long as his party supported him. 
However, while the House created only nine such committees in the entire 
1880-1988 period, since then it has established roughly one each year. They 
have developed into an alternative instrument of parliamentary oversight75 and 
get considerable publicity. Still, not a single minister whose role was denounced 
in these committees has resigned.
u  For instance the Brussels parliament did during the 1989-1994 term not hold a single 
committee meeting on the many abuses the Audit Office had mentioned concerning the public 
tenders of the Brussels Regional Executive.
5 Also in sectors sensitive to political corruption, such as the committee on military tenders, 
arms trade, organised crime, extreme-right terrorism, trade in industrial and nuclear waste, 




























































































(e) Whistle Blowers and Freedom of Information
With regard to citizens’ access to administrative files, enabling to accomplish 
their whistle blowing function, the government has moved towards more 
openness within a wider effort for modernisation and démocratisation of the 
civil service. Since 1991 administrative decisions have to contain a motivation. 
Since 1994, citizens can consult administrative documents, even when they do 
not have a personal interest in them. Still many exceptions are effective. Civil 
servants are bound by professional secret. Administrative documents have to be 
deposited in the governmental archives and can only be consulted after 100 
years. Ministers can decide to make them accessible after 50 years! So even 
after 1991 one cannot freely obtain information on the preparation of 
governmental decisions.
Furthermore, there is no whistle blowers act. On the contrary, the 
overview of the fate of the denouncers of the most important corruption cases 
indicates that the denouncers are the first victims of their act, especially if they 
are civil servants.76 In addition, they are sometimes charged with excessive 
financial claims for defamation by the politicians involved, forcing them to seek 
expensive legal council.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A CORRUPTION- 
FREE PARTITOCRACY?
Many traditional factors that in the literature on political corruption are 
mentioned as facilitators were clearly and strongly present in the Belgian case 
during the 1970s and 1980s. These are generally considered to be the heydays 
of political corruption. A large number of these facilitators refer directly or 
indirectly to the impact of parties in the Belgian polity.
Since the 1991 ‘Black Sunday’ elections the issue of institutional reform 
and refining democracy has moved high up on the agenda of the government, 
political parties and public opinion at large. This has produced a high number of 
reform proposals in a wide range of institutions and procedures that to some 
extent diminish the excesses of partitocracy, making Belgian parties and the 
wider public sector - at least in theory - less vulnerable to political corruption.





























































































• a generous and rather transparent system of public party finance 
including stringent caps on campaign spending (see above);
• restrictions of party patronage in the civil service and wider public sector, 
making public servants less tributary to political parties;
• depoliticization of the judiciary, allowing judges to play a more 
independent role in the fight against corruption;
• restrictions on clientelistic practices of elected officials; the drafting of a 
code for MPs that would curtail their clientelistic interventions in public 
administration.77
• increasing transparency, responsiveness, responsibility and efficacy of 
public administration;
• the reduction of the protection offered by stringent parliamentary 
immunity rules for MPs and ministers, and the expansion of the 
investigative capacity of ordinary courts and investigating judges;
• the installation of permanent watchdog committees on organised crime 
and its attempts to infiltrate politics.
In addition to these structural measures, one can also discern in public opinion a 
trend to take political corruption78 more seriously and reject clientelism more 
than before. The press has started playing a more independent role in reporting 
and unearthing corruption. Finally, probably also the bankruptcy of the Belgian 
state, that probably can be at least partially blamed on the corrupt nature of 
Belgian traditional politics, has reduced the corruption potential. In a state that 
is bankrupt, public opinion, interest groups and competing parties are much 
more vigilant in assuring that the pies of the reduced public cake are efficiently 
allocated to the recipients that need them most or produce the highest 
cost/benefits ratio79.
77 The Flemish parliament has recently accepted such a code, drafted by Dr. De Winter, which 
gradually becomes the standard for similar codes being drafted by other legislative assemblies 
at the national, provincial and local level.
78 According to the Flemish Regional Indicators (VRIND), political corruption ranks second 
(after unemployment) as the most salient issue in 1998.
79 The Agusta Dassault case is interesting for understanding how political corruption can 
complicate the transfer of power from one generation of party leaders to another, and from 
one party culture to another. During the 1977-1989 period, the party was led by president Van 
Miert (EU commissioner between 1989-1999), who had taken over the presidency from 
strongman Willy Claes (who had become vice-PM in 1977), and Van Acker, former minister 
and the mayor of Bruges. In 1980, Mangé had become one of the party fund raisers (and 
remained so until 1995) as the (vice-)director of the party's research centre, the intellectual 
braintrust of the party and parliamentary leadership and training school of the party 




























































































This general transformation of facilitating factors in the context 
surrounding the occult exchange between parties and business has however not 
been entirely smooth. The legislation on public party finance has probably 
reduced corrupt exchange to a considerable degree, but transaction costs were 
high. In most parties, people involved in the grey fundraising and spending of 
the 1980s are in, or aspire to, the highest public offices. This makes them and 
their party quite vulnerable to the old corruption corpses that have been falling 
out of the party’s closets in recent years. They also tried to continue the old 
occult system of financing the party as a way to control the newer generation. In 
addition, often the new generation of upcoming party leaders, responsible for 
running the party organisation in a clean and transparent way, has been forced 
to cover-up for the illicit past behaviour of their party historical leaders. Hence, 
although coming from a generation socialised in a different context and value
secretary, a formalisation of the informal influence she had managed to build up in the 
previous years. Although the SP had a long history of functioning with black money, like in 
the other parties, the 1980s were unequalled in terms of grey financing. Hence grew a 
permissive culture in the leadership about accepting large gifts from enterprises, that would be 
collected by the party treasurer or other fundraisers (like some chefs de cabinet) and 
channelled to the party through a network of satellite bureaux around the party research centre 
laundering black’gifts through fictious invoices and payment checks. When in 1988 the party 
returned to government, Willy Claes became vice-PM and Van Miert aspired to become EU- 
commissioner, a leadership transfer was necessary. Being the logical candidate, the 
flamboyant leader of the parliamentary party, Tobback, preferred to remain minister, the 
choice went to his "crown prince", the young ascetic Vandenbroucke, who was also one of the 
promoters of the 1989 bill on public and transparent party finance. When Vandebroucke took 
over the leadership, he told Mangé and Galle that he would not want the central party financed 
anymore with company gifts, black or white. The latter two promised to do as the leader 
wished, but behind his back continued business as usual. This including the acceptance of the 
gifts of Agusta and Dassault (the largest they ever got), which they mainly distributed as 
campaign subsidies to the regional party electoral heads of list, and as payments in black for 
the personnel of the party research centre. This way Claes and Van Miert also managed to 
retain their informal influence in the party. Only after two years, when Vandenbroucke 
managed to promote Galle out of the way, did he finally get a real grip on the party finance. 
He and his new national secretary discovered the remainders of the black money of Galle and 
Mangé (5 million BEF), which Vandenbroucke ordered Mangé to bum. As it was black 
money, he argued that it could not be inserted anymore into transparent national party 
accounts for which he carried legal responsibility. This 'burning order' cost him his position of 
vice-PM when the Agusta scandal finally broke out in 1995 (at the start of the electoral 
campaign). Hence, illegal party finance was used as an instrument to circumvent the formal 
party power holders with different ethical standards operating within a new context of more 
transparent party finance. In their downfall (Claes and Mangé got convicted in the Agusta- 
Dassault trial), they provoked irreparable damage to Clean Hands Vandenbroucke, while also 
many old-timers managed to stay untouched (Van Miert, Galle and all leaders that did not ask 




























































































system, they are stained by their party’s past, and several were forced to 
sacrifice their clean hands reputation for saving their party’s historical leaders.
Lieven DE WINTER
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APPENDIX : Della Porta’s (1999) 15 hypotheses
Hypothesis Belgium
Influence of party system on spread of corruption
• Political corruption favoured by ‘cartel’ parties Yes, most likely given 
strong cartelisation of 
parties
• Political corruption favoured by high cost of politics Yes, especially in 1970s and 
1980s
• Corruption facilitated by spread of party power over 
administration
Yes, especially in 1970s and 
1980s
How parties help spread of corruption [when political 
corruption becomes systemic):
• political parties sanction occult transactions May be, but difficult to 
proof
• political parties play important role in socialising members 
to illegality
May be, but difficult to 
proof
• political parties reduce risk involved in illegal exchanges May be, but difficult to 
proof
• political parties act as guarantors of illegal business May be, but difficult to 
proof
Participation in occult transactions transforms ways in which 
parties fulfil traditional roles [when political corruption 
becomes systemic):
• political parties select business politicians Some clear cases, but 
probably not in a systematic 
way
• political parties develop clientelistic relationship with 
supporters
Strong supportive evidence
• political parties select demands that are supposed to bring 
more bribes
Maybe, but difficult to proof
How corruption affects the party system 
• favours development of connivance in the party system Quite likely
• when corruption is systemic, other invisible actors may 
substitute political parties as guarantors of illegal exchange
How corruption transforms the party structure
May become relevant in 
near future with the 
profiliation of mafias
• When corruption spreads, positions connected with 
clandestine financial transactions acquire greater importance
Yes, but difficult to proof
• When corruption is widespread, invisible, unofficial 
structures emerge in the parties
Yes, but difficult to map
• Invisible party structure produces centrifugal tendencies in 
parties
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